A Case for Information Operations at the Ops Level – OR – Developing an Environmental Operational Capability

Last week I attended a Northrop Grumman sponsored EW (Electronic Warfare) briefing and event and realized just how pervasiveness the digital and communications have become. Moreover I see how digital communications is grinding its way to the operational level. Once the sole purview of engineers and their jamming transmitters a Colonel summed up his views on EW thusly,  "Everything has computers now, so as far I'm concerned it's all cyberwarfare."

While we still need to ensure those missiles can't find our friendly targets it struck me how we also need to make sure the Twitterverse doesn't see our operators coming and the best way to do that is to expand EW beyond jamming and include operational-level training in social media.

For the last couple hundred years we’ve understood war as being an occupation for and the province of professional military personnel.  It’s been said that war is, “Old folks talking while the young die.”  As cold and callus as that sounds it captures the split between those who engage in direct action against an enemy, warriors, and those who talk: officials, politicians, diplomats and the like.

Technology changes everything eventually, and so must our worldview evolve to encompass the new realities technology sometimes forces upon us. While it’s true we’ve had military personnel dedicated to word-war (if you will) since WWII, largely under the PsyOps umbrella, the proliferation of technology and specifically social media necessitates the development of information operational capabilities at the operational level.  We need to bring information operational capabilities to the combat level in addition to traditional information channels, political and diplomatic.

We need to look at information operations from an environmental perspective, much as we would any operating environment. The proliferation of information sharing (social media being the latest evolution) has created enough of a critical mass that we cannot simply leave the information operations activities entirely to the political machine.  The operators must also master the information environment.

Social media continues to blur and blend the boundaries between what we once thought of as two distinct and separated environments; the physical and digital worlds. While I agree with many operators that warfare is the ultimate direct action of do what I say or die. The potential for operational impact from social channels is far too high for the operators to ignore or leave in the hands of politicians.  I wouldn’t let my Congress person pack my chute or check my Drager or plot a course to a tactical objective.

For example, when SEAL Team VI took down Bin Laden, Abbottabad residents were tweeting the arrival of the Chinooks before the Stealth Hawks landed.  Had these enemies better coordinated this social intelligence –things may have been far more challenging for our operators.

It is simply no longer possible to separate the information operations from the physical – think Wiki Leaks – the impact of the release of these documents had real impact upon physical operations.

So we need to focus on building both intelligence capabilities and direct action capabilities within the information operating environment – exactly the same way we develop these capabilities for all operating environments.  See, Air, Land, and now social cyberspace.